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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
HOWARD B. CAHOON,

')

Plaintiff and Respondent.

v.
ROBERT P. PELTON,

\

I

Case No.
8976

)

Defendant and Appellant.

PETITION FOR REHEARING AND
BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The Appellant respectfully petitions for a rehearing
herein on the grounds discussed in detail hereinafter. In
addition to the detailed treatment of points as set forth
herein and in Appellant's other briefs, one general observation is made.
The appeal involves several questions. of first impression, and authorities from other jurisdictions have been
cited by Appellant in support of Appellant's contentions
thereon. Despite the novelty of these questions and the
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authorities cited in support of Appellant's position, the
Court has brushed these points off with the statement that
they are without merit and will not be discussed in detail.
Appellant submits that the said points are valid, that Appellant's contentions thereon are correct, and that said
points deserve full and detailed treatment by the Court.
Appellant has the impression that he has failed to direct
the Court's full attention to these points and that they represent a part of the briefs which has not received full and
critical treatment. Appellant urges the Court to reconsider
the said points, giving to each such point the same full and
careful consideration which has distinguished the Court's
decisions in the past.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE ALLEGED MARRIAGE B E T WE EN
PLAINTIFF AND MRS. SHAW PROVIDES NO
BASIS FOR A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST
DEFENDANT.
POINT II.
AN ACTION FOR CRIMINAL CONVERSATION
IS NOT PERMITTED UNDER THE UTAH
LAW.
POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE
JURY ON THE ISSUE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND IN PERMITTING EVIDENCE OF
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WEALTH TO BE INTRODUCED ON THE ISSUE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES.
POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A NEW
TRIAL ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION.
The majority opinion states the law which we believe
is applicable to the instant case. It is as follows :
"California, the same as Utah, and all other
states, holds that a second marriage is void if at
any time one of the parties has an undivorced husband or wife living. Generally, the laws of the state
where the marriage is consummated determine its
validity."
The only question properly before the Court respecting
this point is whether or not the marriage performed between Mrs. Shaw and Howard B. Cahoon was a valid marriage at the time it was performed. We believe that the
Utah Supreme Court in Jenkins v. Jenkins, 107 Utah 239,
153 P. 2d 262; Sanders v. Industrial Commission, 64 Utah
372, 230 Pac. 1026; and In Re Dalton's Estate, 109 Utah
503, 167 P. 2d 690, holds it was not. Justice Henriod in a
dissenting opinion in the instant case says it was not. Justice Wade and Keller say it was a valid marriage for all
purposes. Justice Crockett says it was a valid marriage in
the instant case but may not have been a valid marriage if
the equities had been different. Justice McDonough concurs
in the result. Whether or not he concurred with the two
majority Justices on the issue of the validity of the Cahoon
marriage is, of course, impossible to determine. We thus
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have an opinion which may hold that marriages performed
in Utah involving a party who has not been finally divorced
in California may or may not be valid depending on the
equities of each case. The opinion of Justice Crockett opens
the question as to whether a common law marriage may,
in Utah, provide the basis for an action for alienation of
affections and criminal conversation. Wouldn't a common
law marriage confer a "color of title?"
We submit that a determination of the validity of a
marriage depending on each individual case violates the
constitution of the State of Utah which in Article I, Section 24 provides :
"All laws of a general nature shall have uniform
operation."
Certainly, lawyers advising their clients on the question
of marriage should be able to give them a definite opinion
as to their status at the time of the marriage. They should
not be required to advise them that they are married or not
married depending on what occurs in the future.

POINT V.
THE COURT COMThiiTTED PREJUDICIAL
ERROR AT THE SECOND TRIAL IN GIVING
INSTRUCTION NO. 11 (R. 124-125).
This instruction without question inconsistently advises the jury. In one part of the instruction the jurors
were correctly told that plaintiff could not recover if his
wife's affections were alienated in Nevada. Near the end
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of the instruction, the jurors were told that plaintiff could
recover if "Robert P. Pelton was not in Nevada at the time
he caused her to lose her affections for Howard B. Cahoon."
This, of course, was wrong. The Court did not choose to
discuss this error, apparently concluding it was not prejudicial.
POINT VI.
PLAINTIFF IS BARRED FROM BRINGING
AN ACTION ARISING OUT OF HIS MARRIAGE BY REASON OF A PRIOR DIVORCE
OBTAINED BY MRS. SHAW BASED ON HIS
MISCONDUCT.
The question raised in Point VI had previously been
decided by a three to two court in Sadlier v. Knapton, 5
Utah 2d 33, 296 P. 2d 278. Inasmuch as the Court deciding
the instant case consisted of a new member, we felt the
Court might want to reconsider the effect of the Sadlier
case. It apparently did not care to do so and we have nothing to add to the argument made in Point VI of the brief
of appellant on file herein.
POINT VII.
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN REFUSING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 22 (R. 114)
AND IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 13 (R.
126) AND NO. 15 (R. 128).
Point VII, we believe, raised an important question
which merited some discussion. The effect of the instruc-
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tion was to permit the jury to award damages to the plaintiff beyond the time of divorce which his wife obtained
from him on December 4, 1956 in the Nevada courts. This
marriage terminated plaintiff's legal right to any services
from his former wife. The jury was permitted to award
damages to him for this right which had been forfeited.
This goes far beyond the Sadlier case supra and is contrary
to the cases cited by the appellant in his brief on file herein.
The only law which we have found which in any way supports the Court's position is in dicta contained in the
Oldroyd case. In Beach v. Brown, 20 Wash. 266,43 L. R. A.
114, 72 Am. St. Rep. 98, 5 Pac. 46, the Court categorically
stated : "Of course, the damages could not be calculated
after the time when the decree of divorce was obtained."
This Court without discussing any of the cases cited
by the appellant in support of the proposition stated in
Point VII simply dismisses the question by stating that the
point is without merit and will not be discussed in detail.

POINT VIII.
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY ON THE
LIFE EXPECTANCY TABLES, INSTRUCTION
NO. 7, FIRST TRIAL, (R. 21), INSTRUCTION
NO. 15, SECOND TRIAL (R. 128) AND IN PERMITTING COUNSEL TO ARGUE FROM THE
SAME TO THE JURY.
We cited Johnson v. Richards, 50 Idaho 150, 294 Pac.
507, wherein the Idaho court explicitly held that it was
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error to instruct a jury on life expectancy tables in a case
involving alienation of affections. We thought the case was
directly in point and particularly applicable because counsel
at great length, as the records will show, argued from the
life expectancy tables.
This is a case of first impression on the question of life
expectancy tables in alienation of affections and criminal
conversation cases in the State of Utah. We sincerely submit that the point should have been reviewed by the court,
particularly inasmuch as these recent alienation of affections cases are paving the way for numerous more of the
same kind which will be filed in the courts in the near
future.
We believe that the point is especially important, because counsel for the plaintiff especially emphasized the
life expectancy feature in his argument to the jury. We
cited cases from several jurisdictions wherein this practice,
aside from the question of admissibility of life expectancy
tables, was held error. The court considered none of these
cases.
POINT IX.
THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE SECOND TRIAL IN ALLOWING
AN OFFSET OF $17,000.00 AGAINST ONLY
THE ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS JUDGMENT.
In urging a reconsideration of Point IX, we can only
add to what has already been stated in Appellant's Brief
that the jury never intended the result achieved by the trial

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

court, i. e., allowing the offset of $17,000.00 to be applied
only against the alienation of affections judgment. The
jurors obviously intended the $17,000.00 to be applied
against the whole judgment. That this was their intention
was recognized by the trial Judge in his Memorandum Decision. He nevertheless confined the offset to the alienation
of affections action, thus reducing the jurors' intended set
off by $13,500.00 We submit that by doing so the trial
court reached a result which was radically different than
the result intended by the jury.

POINT X.
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN PERMITTING COUNSEL FOR THE
DEFENDANT TO READ TO THE JURORS
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS FROM DEPOSITIONS IN WHICH THE WITNESSES CLAIMED
THEIR PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION.
POINT XI.
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN REFUSING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NOS. 24, 25 AND
26.

The foregoing points are related and are therefore discussed together herein.
We believe that the legal questions raised under Points
X and XI are of great constitutional importance and of
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first impression in this State. Whether or not a claim of
privilege is admissible as a basis for an inference is the
subject of an annotation in 24 A. L. R. 2d 896. There the
editors note that the courts which have decided the question
uniformly hold that "refusal alone cannot be made a basis
of any inference by the jury."
The editors further note "No case has been found expressing a view opposite to the general rule as stated above."
The Utah trial court held contra to the general rule
stated herein. We sincerely submit that the trial court
should be reviewed on the question. It is very frustrating
and discouraging to cite cases declaring a unanimous viewpoint contrary to what a trial court has held and on a very
material and current constitutional question and have the
reviewing court review in silence. We submit that the question merits a decision.
POINT XII.
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN REFUSING TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 20.
Perhaps the most important "fact" defense the defendant had in the instant case was the conduct of the plaintiff's wife in going out with other men; in fact, it was the
only fact defense offered. Consistent with this defense,
defendant requested the Court to instruct the jury with
reference to the law applicable thereto which is that the
jurors may and should consider this fact in mitigation of
damages. The Court did not so instruct; in fact, the Court
eliminated a consideration of the issue by advising the
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jurors in the Court's Instruction No. 11 that they were in
effect to disregard such matters. Certainly, this Court has
held often enough that each party is entitled to have a jury
instructed on its theory of the case. In the instant case,
the jury was not so instructed.

POINT XIII.
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 12.

POINT XIV.
THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR IN ITS INSTRUCTION NO. 13.
What has been said with reference to Point VII is
equally applicable to Points XIII and XIV. The instructions
excepted to enabled the jurors to find damages for mental
anguish and distress, past, present and future and for loss
of companionship, aid, society and services not only before
plaintiff obtained a divorce from his wife but in perpetuity
thereafter so long as plaintiff or his wife should live. We
believe that no Appellate Court would write an opinion in
which it would specifically hold that such damages are allowable even after a wife has obtained a divorce from her
husband because of extreme mental cruelty. The trial court
so held, and this Court by its. silence has approved. Of
course, it goes without saying that this was material and
highly prejudicial to defendant.
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POINT XV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING
TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL ON THE GROUNDS
THAT THE VERDICT WAS GROSSLY EXCESSIVE AND UNWARRANTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
Counsel cannot add anything to what has already been
stated in the Brief of Appellant on file herein with reference to point XV. We sincerely submit that the only way
the Court can review this point properly is by reviewing
the entire trial transcript.

CONCLUSION
We believe that the case before this Court has raised
important and material questions which have not been
decided by the Court. Some of these questions are of first
impression, such as the admissibility of life expectancy
tables in alienation of affections and criminal conversation;
the right to damages for loss of services, mental anguish
and companionship in the future when it affirmatively
appears that the marriage has been terminated through the
fault of the plaintiff; the admissibility of a claim of privilege, and whether or not a claim of privilege may be con-sidered by the jurors as in inference of guilt, first as to the
defendant, and second as to a witness who is not a defendant. The Court also was asked to review the trial court's
failure to instruct the jury on defendant's theory of the
case. Some of these questions are of constitutional im-
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portance. We feel that all of them were material, and that
the error committed was prejudicial.
Finally, a judgment of this amount is disastrous to any
individual. Mr. Pelton will suffer irreparably and far
beyond any damage done to the plaintiff. We earnestly and
sincerely submit that the Court should reconsider its ruling,
particularly with reference to the last eleven points about
which the Court re·mained silent in its opinion.
Respectfully submitted,
VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & McCARTHY,
Leonard J. Lewis,
Clifford L. Ashton,
Counsel for Appellant
and Defendant.
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